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Abstract
This paper presents a key escrow system which meets possible requirements for
international use, where escrow agencies do not span more than one country.
We rst propose a special conference key distribution scheme, where the key
consists of contributions from all members. Each member can independently
choose how often to access the conference key and update his contribution to
the key. We then make use of this scheme to design a multi-agency escrow
mechanism. Each escrow agency can independently provide warranted access
to the user's communications, although they must have access to certain public
information from other agencies via a globally accessible le.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Modern mobile telecommunications systems are breaking down the regulatory boundaries
between dierent countries. In particular, third generation mobile systems are intended to
provide communications networks covering the whole world. To meet growing legitimate
needs for condentiality, an end-to-end encryption service will need to be provided in these
future mobile networks. In contrast to this user requirement, governments may need to
intercept user trac in this international communications environment to combat crime
and protect their national security.
Consider the following scenario: two mobile users A and B, who communi-
cate with each other using end-to-end encryption, are citizens of countries
C and D, respectively, work in countries E and F , are registered with two
mobile companies based in countries G and H, and are roaming in two coun-
tries I and J . Their trac might conceivably need to be intercepted by law
enforcement agencies in any of countries C   J .
Note also that a user might wish to make use of an international telecommunications
system with key escrow for one or more of the following reasons.
1. The user has to get assistance to establish secure communications with other users.
2. The user wants to have a recovery or back-up function for a session key to enable
recovery if the key is lost (e.g., see [12] and [9]).
3. The user wants to use a third party as a notary to prevent the other user from
denying the communications later.
4. The user wants to get protection from his government if something unpredictable
occurs associated with the communications.
5. The user is legally obliged to escrow keys used for end-to-end encryption.
Hence an international key escrow system may be required which provides relevant agen-
cies of all governments involved with warranted access to user communications. To make
matters more complicated, the agencies involved may not trust one other. For example,
a law enforcement agency in one country might not wish to let its counterpart in another
country know that a particular user's communications are being intercepted.
1.2 Design requirements
Following the US government's Clipper proposals [1], a number of key escrow systems
have recently been proposed, and for an overview of the eld, the reader is referred to
[4]. Certain key escrow systems have been designed specically for international use, in
that two domains are involved. For examples, Jeeries, Mitchell and Walker [7] make use
of a pair of trusted third parties as escrow agencies, one in each domain, who separately
compute an escrowed key using a secret key shared between them. Frankel and Yung
[6] consider a key escrow agency (or agencies) working for mutually distrusting domains.
Chen, Gollmann and Mitchell [3] adopt multiple third parties, who are trusted collectively
but not individually, to perform key escrow in mutually mistrusting domains.
In this paper, we describe an international key escrow scheme for the case where more than
two countries are involved, and where the countries involved do not trust one another; for
the maximum generality we refer to domains instead of countries throughout. We refer
to interception authorities where we mean bodies such as law enforcement agencies who
may be given the right to access communications within a single domain. We also refer
to escrow agencies who will be responsible for maintaining all the information necessary
to provide access to interception agencies, when presented with the appropriate legal
authorisation.
We now state our requirements for key escrow in multiple domains.
1. Escrow agencies will not span more than one domain, although they must have
access to public information from other domains. This public information, for
which retrieving agencies must be provided with origin authentication and integrity
services by some means, is either placed in a globally accessible le or sent with the
messages which can be intercepted for warranted interception.
2. No domain can individually control the generation of an escrowed key, and the
escrowed key consists of contributions from all domains.
3. Escrow agencies in dierent domains can separately gain access to the escrowed
key.
4. Escrow agencies in dierent domains can separately choose how often to update
their contribution to an escrowed key.
5. Apart from the escrow agency in the domain that is responsible for providing the
user authentication and key distribution service, escrow agencies do not have to be
on-line during user authentication and key distribution processing.
In this paper we use a conference key scheme to construct a multiple domain key es-
crow system meeting the above requirements. The proposed mechanism is based upon
the Die-Hellman algorithm for key exchange [5]. An escrowed key is an n-iterated
Die-Hellman exponentiation, where n is the total number of users and escrow agencies
involved.
2 Key escrow mechanism
2.1 Background
The proposed mechanism operates in the context of a single user making use of a key
escrow service involving multiple domains, each domain having an escrow agency selected
by the user. The key escrow service does the following.
 It provides support for key establishment for the user, when communicating with
other users (examples of how this operates are provided in Section 2.5).
 The key is established for the user in such a way that an escrow agency in any
domain can provide warranted access to that user's communications, without direct
support from any of the agencies in other domains.
2.2 A conference key scheme
We next describe a conference key distribution scheme, on which our key escrow system
is based. As was mentioned earlier, an escrow agency in one domain might not wish
to let the agencies in any other domains know that a particular user's communications
are being intercepted. For this reason we have a special requirement on our conference
key scheme, namely that not all the members need actively participate in computing
the conference key, provided that an authenticated copy of each member's public key
agreement key is accessible to all other members.
A number of conference key schemes have recently been proposed. Burmester and
Desmedt, [2], surveyed various basic congurations for conference key distribution, e.g.
`star', `tree', `broadcast' and `cycle', which are designed to exploit the particular cong-
uration of the network used. The star based conguration with a conference chair meets
our requirement. However, in a typical star based protocol, the chair totally controls key
generation, which could be a major problem in the context of our key escrow scheme.
We now present a conference key distribution scheme in which the distributed key is
an n-iterated Die-Hellman exponentiation when n members are involved; this scheme
meets our requirement for use in an escrow scheme. The basic idea of the scheme was
previously described by Steer et al. in 1988 [11] using a cycle based protocol. For the
purposes of our key escrow mechanism, we make use of a star conguration, and let the
key be a function of all the member's public key agreement keys, such that no member
including the chair can individually control key generation.
The proposed scheme makes use of a globally accessible le.
Denition 1 We say that GAF is a Globally Accessible File if each authorised entity
can read all messages in GAF , and can also write messages to the GAF . Origin au-
thentication and data integrity for data retrieved from the GAF are provided by using a
globally agreed digital signature algorithm. All the entities each have their own signature
key/verication key pair and exchange verication keys in a reliable way.
Algorithm 2 Let U
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then places all the public key agreement values (P
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GAF , in each case signed by U
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.
3. Each member U
i
(2  i  n) then reads certain of the other members' signed
public key agreement keys (P
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members' public veri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Theorem 3 By following the above algorithm, all members of the conference can inde-
pendently compute the same conference key.
Proof. We simply need to show that the key y
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nition:
y
i1
= F (S
U
i
; P
U
1
U
2
:::U
i 1
)
= F (S
U
i
; F (S
U
1
U
2
:::U
i 1
; g))
= F (S
U
1
U
2
:::U
i 1
; F (S
U
i
; g)) (by the commutativity property of exponentiation)
= F (S
U
1
U
2
:::U
i 1
; P
U
i
)
= S
U
1
U
2
:::U
i
Thus, by induction, we can show that y
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result follows. 2
2.3 The escrow mechanism
Suppose that userA hasm escrow agencies T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
m
, one per domain. The identiers
of the m escrow agencies associated with A will need to be bound in some way to the
identier of A, typically by means of a signature veriable by all parties. One of the
agencies must be capable of real-time communications with the user | we call this the
on-line agency; the others are referred to as o-line agencies. Note that which of the m
agencies is on-line may vary. Without loss of generality suppose the on-line agency is T
1
.
For example, in future mobile telecommunications networks, A's identity, concatenated
with the identities of A's m escrow agencies, might be signed by a telecommunications
service provider. In such a case, the public signature verication key of the service
provider would need to be known to all relevant agencies in a reliable way. Further, the
on-line agency could be the network operator for the network which A is currently using
to access the telecommunications service.
Prior to use of the mechanism, T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
m
and A need to agree a number of parameters.
 They must agree among them values g and p. These values may be dierent for each
group of escrow agencies associated with a user, and must the properties required
for secure operation of Die-Hellman key agreement (see Section 2.2).
 They must agree on a digital signature algorithm, each have their own signature
key/verication key pair, and exchange verication keys in a reliable way (e.g. using
signed public key certicates). In fact the user A only needs to know the on-line
agency's public verication key, and hence A need not store the public keys for
those escrow agencies which are never required to be `on-line agencies'.
 They must agree a conference key distribution scheme, which can be used to estab-
lish a secret key S
T
1
T
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:::T
m
satisfying 1  S
T
1
T
2
:::T
m
 p  1. In the previous section,
we described a conference key scheme with appropriate properties, and we use this
scheme to construct our escrow mechanism below. However, this could be replaced
with other suitable conference key schemes.
Before use of the mechanism the following preparatory work also needs to be performed.
 An authority trusted by A (e.g. A's Service Provider in a telecommunications en-
vironment) must sign a string consisting of A's name concatenated with a set of
escrow agencies. This signed string shall be provided to A. There may be many
such signed strings, for use by A in diering circumstances (e.g. depending on which
country A is working in).
 Each escrow agency T
i
shall insert a public key agreement key for A in the GAF
(and shall retain the corresponding private key agreement key). The public key can
be stored in the GAF tagged with A's identity.
The mechanism below can be used byA and the escrow agencies T
1
, T
2
, ..., T
m
to establish
an escrowed key K
A
.
Mechanism 4 A initially chooses one of the escrow agencies from its set of m escrow
agencies to be the on-line entity. The identity of the on-line identity will typically vary
depending on the location of A. As previously described, we denote the on-line agency by
T
1
and the m  1 o-line agencies by T
2
; T
3
; : : : ; T
m
.
1. A sends a request for a new key to T
1
, together with a copy of its identity concate-
nated with the identities of T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
m
all signed by a trusted authority.
2. T
1
checks the signature, and places the signed string in GAF to start chairing the
conference among T
1
; T
2
; : : : ; T
m
. T
1
also recovers the public keys for A for each of
the other agencies T
2
; T
3
; : : : ; T
m
(P
T
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; P
T
3
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T
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say). Following the conference
key distribution scheme described in Algorithm 2, T
1
also computes P
T
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T
2
T
i
, for
every i (2  i  m  1), and places these values in the GAF .
3. Following the conference key scheme described in Algorithm 2, each member of the
conference can now (if they wish) obtain the private conference key S
T
1
T
2
:::T
m
.
4. T
1
signs the public conference key value P
T
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T
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m
= F (S
T
1
T
2
:::T
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; g), and sends this
signed key to A.
5. A generates his private key agreement key S
A
and the corresponding public key
agreement key P
A
= F (S
A
; g). A then computes the escrowed key as K
A
= F (S
A
;
P
T
1
T
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).
6. A signs P
A
and sends it with messages encrypted using K
A
. These messages may
be intercepted for warranted interception.
7. Any entity given the private conference key and P
A
can compute the escrowed key
as K
A
= F (S
T
1
T
2
:::T
m
; P
A
).
2.4 Warranted interception
When a warrant for legal interception of a message is required in one domain, there are
then two possible ways for the escrow agency to provide warranted access to the message.
 The agency could pass the private conference key to the interception authority in
the same domain, and then take no further part in the interception process.
 The agency could compute the session key used to encrypt a message presented
to it by the interception authority (using the private conference key), decipher the
message, and then return it the authority, without revealing the conference key
itself.
2.5 Application examples
We conclude the mechanism description by considering three examples of communications
services where it could be employed. In these examples we assume that data transferred to
and from the GAF has its origin and integrity protected (e.g. by the use of signatures and
signed certicates). We also assume that all the verication key certicates and signed
public key agreement keys are sent with the encrypted messages, so that these public
keys will be accessible to any related users, escrow agencies and interception authorities.
Example 1 Mobile telephony between users A and B, where A and B both make use of
a key escrow service.
Suppose that A has m escrow agencies T
1
, T
2
, ..., T
m
, and B has n escrow agencies V
1
,
V
2
, ..., V
n
. A is roaming in the domain with an on-line escrow agency T
1
, and B is
roaming in the domain with an on-line escrow agency V
1
. By following the procedure of
Mechanism 4, A's asymmetric escrowed key pair is (K
A
= S
AT
1
T
2
:::T
m
, P
K
A
= F (K
A
; g)),
and B's asymmetric escrowed key pair is (K
B
= S
BV
1
V
2
:::V
n
, P
K
B
= F (K
B
; g)). A and
B then exchange their public escrowed keys in a reliable way, e.g. by sending the keys
signed by T
1
and V
1
respectively, with their encrypted messages. A and B can establish a
shared encryption key as K
AB
= F (K
A
; P
K
B
) = F (K
B
; P
K
A
). This key can be separately
computed by all the escrow agencies associated with A or B.
Example 2 Email from A to B, i.e. A is the sender and B is the receiver, where only
the receiver makes use of a key escrow service.
Suppose that only B has associated escrow agencies V
1
; V
2
; : : : ; V
n
(where V
1
is on-line).
By following the procedure of Mechanism 4, B's asymmetric escrowed key pair is (K
B
=
S
BV
1
V
2
:::V
n
, P
K
B
= F (K
B
; g)). A has his own asymmetric key agreement key pair (S
A
,
P
A
= F (S
A
; g)). Using these two key pairs, A and B establish a shared key as K
AB
=
F (S
A
; P
K
B
) = F (K
B
; P
A
). This key is escrowed by all domains associated with B. In
[7], the receiver's private key agreement key is escrowed by both the sender's domain and
receiver's domain. This can be considered as a special case of this example.
Example 3 Encrypted le storage for user A, where A makes use of a key escrow service.
Suppose that A has associated escrow agencies T
1
, T
2
, ..., T
m
(where T
1
is on-line). By
following the procedure of Mechanism 4, the key used for the stored le encryption is
K
A
= S
AT
1
T
2
:::T
m
, which is escrowed by all domains associated with A.
3 Analysis of the mechanism
The mechanism has the following properties.
 First note that in the conference key distribution procedure, every member apart
from the chair only places his public key agreement key in GAF , and makes no other
contribution. If one member renews his contribution for a session, the conference
key is changed. Any members who are interested in the current session must read
the GAF and compute the renewed key. However, if one member does not want to
update his own key agreement key, and/or is not interested in the current session,
he takes no action, as long as his old public key agreement key is still available in
GAF . This property allows all the members, apart from the chair, `independently'
to choose how often to update their contribution to the conference key and to gain
access to the key without communicating with any other members.
Thus, for the key escrow mechanism, each agency can separately choose when to
update its own contribution and when to gain access to the escrowed key. As long
as the GAF does not reveal who accesses which data, no agency in any domain
will know if the other agencies are interested in a particular user's communications.
This property meets our basic requirement for an international key escrow model
described in section 1.2.
 An escrowed key in the proposed mechanism is a function of contributions from the
user and all relevant escrow agencies, and no individual can control key generation.
One advantage is that if any entity updates its contribution using a fresh (i.e. not
a replay of an old key) and random (i.e. not predictable by any party) number, the
key will be fresh and random. Any entity which has updated his contribution to
the key can verify the freshness of the key. Another benet is that this property
prevents two users, e.g. in Example 1 or 2, abusing the mechanism by using the
`shadow-public-key' attack proposed by Kilian and Leighton [8]. Chen, Gollmann
and Mitchell, [3], discussed how the attack could work in a key escrow system based
on Die-Hellman key exchange. However, other abuses by collusion among entities
may still be possible. We must note that it is dicult for any key escrow system to
force two users to use only the current escrow key for their end-to-end encryption
if the users share a secret or can use their own security system.
 In the conference key scheme, any contribution of the chair, apart from his own
public key agreement key, can be veried by at least one of the other members. It
is simple to see that P
U
1
U
2
can be separately computed by U
2
, and each P
U
1
U
2
:::U
i
(3  i  n) can be separately computed by U
j
(2  j  i), given P
U
1
U
2
:::U
j 1
.
This property to some extent prevent the chair from `cheating'. Even if the chair
colludes with one or more members, e.g. with U
2
to U
i
(3  i  n), by contributing
a forged P
U
1
U
2
:::U
i
, their behaviour only results in changing their contributions to
the key, and hence they gain nothing by such an `attack'.
Note that if none of the other members veries the chair's contributions, the chair,
by contributing a forged P
U
1
U
2
:::U
i
, can force the other members to form two sub-
conferences, so that U
2
, U
3
, ..., U
i
accept one key and U
i+1
, U
i+2
, ..., U
n
accept
another key. Even worse, if the scheme is used in the proposed key escrow mecha-
nism, the chair T
1
can blind all the other agencies and escrow the user's key alone.
If this is considered as a serious weakness, the mechanism should explicitly include
a verication function, so that each relevant entity checks the chair's contributions
and broadcasts any contribution which does not match the protocol specications.
 There is no need to transfer any secret messages in the mechanism. Only origin
authentication and data integrity are required. All relevant public key agreement
keys must be accessible for any related entities, e.g, by being placed in GAF or
sent with messages interceptable on warrant.
 As with any other key escrow system with escrow agencies, a user must trust the
agency he appoints to act on his behalf. In the proposed mechanism, the user must
trust each escrow agency to maintain the escrowed key properly, i.e. not reveal it
or use it illegally. In environments where this requirement is too strong for an
individual agency, it is possible that some users will want the extra reassurance
oered by having their keys shared between a number of independent agencies in
each domain. The proposed mechanism can be adapted to provide this feature by
using a set of moderately trusted agencies, e.g. see [3].
 The security of the proposed mechanism is based on the intractability of the Die-
Hellman problem, i.e. that given elements g, g
x
and g
y
mod p it is computationally
infeasible to obtain g
xy
, which has withstood detailed scrutiny over a period of
time. Note that the Die-Hellman problem can certainly be solved using discrete
logarithms, and Maurer [10] presents some evidence for the equivalence of the two
problems.
The use of modular exponentiation in the mechanism can be generalised by using
any function F satisfying the Die-Hellman commutativity and computational
intractability conditions.
4 Conclusions
The conference key scheme presented allows each member of the conference `indepen-
dently' to choose how often to access the conference key and update his contribution to
the key, although his updated contribution will be used by all the other members to renew
the key. Based on this scheme, we have proposed a key escrow mechanism suitable for
international use. The security of the proposed mechanism is based on the intractability
of the Die-Hellman scheme.
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